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Abstract 
This paper is an empirical contribution to the literature on the formation of policy preferences on 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) reform within its Member States. In the aftermath of the 
euro crisis, many proposals to ‘complete’ EMU have been tabled. However, discord among 
Member States has led to a piecemeal restructuring of EMU. For this paper, a survey has been 
conducted among euro area academic experts, gauging preferences on EMU reform. We find that 
general consensus masks significant discord among academics from different Member States. 
Our data indicates the existence of conflicting national epistemic communities, bound by shared 
causal beliefs on macro-economic policy. Academics within the key creditor Member State, 
Germany, assume an outlier position. Within the sample of German academics, economists are 
particularly strongly opposed to all moves in the direction of fiscal or social union.  As 
economists are those academic experts most likely to influence the economic policy beliefs 
dominant among the German policy elite, these results are highly politically salient. We confront 
these findings with the literature on the exceptionalism of German economics. We contend that 
our results substantiate the claim that inadequate EMU reform and, more generally, the EU 
approach to the Eurozone crisis, can be partially explained by the firm grip these economic 
doctrines hold over the economics profession and policy-making circles in Germany. 
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Introduction 
Why is the Eurozone, more than four years after the outbreak of the euro crisis, still very much in 
dire straits?
1
 According to several critical observers, piecemeal and counterproductive reform to 
the institutional make-up of the economic and monetary union (EMU) explains its current 
predicament. As is well-known, the euro crisis policy response has, until now, mainly consisted 
of a combination of bail-outs, austerity and structural reforms (e.g. Draghi 2012; Rehn 2013). 
Institutionally, this has meant the construction of a permanent bail-out fund, the bolstering of 
fiscal rules and the creation of fiscal surveillance mechanisms. Practically, the rescue operations 
for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and later Cyprus were accompanied by strict ‘economic adjustment 
programs’ including fiscal contraction measures and a structural reform agenda comprising 
labour market reforms, increases to value-added and excise taxes, public-sector wage cuts and 
reductions in pensions, social expenditures and public investment, going into such details as to 
stipulate that firm-level collective bargaining agreements shall prevail over sectoral and 
occupational agreements (cfr. Scharpf 2011: 27ff). However, many observers argue that these 
responses have been insufficient to fix the design failures in the Eurozone (e.g. De Grauwe 
2013).  
But why has this been so? Are policy-makers unwilling or unable to implement those 
reforms necessary to exit the crisis and put EMU on a sustainable footing? A plethora of interest-
based and institutionalist accounts explain the policy reaction to the Eurozone crisis through an 
emphasis on two factors: the supremacy of creditor interests and the inhibition of far-reaching 
reform by the institutional and political setting.
2
 Yet, these explanations neglect the role of ideas 
in the preference-formation of creditor states. Expecting a rule-based ‘rescue-cum-retrenchment 
strategy’ (Scharpf 2011) to deliver debt repayment, let alone sustainable economic growth, 
essentially depends on the assumption of certain economic ideas (Blyth 2013; Dullien 2013).  
                                                          
1 The survey for this paper has been drafted and administered in cooperation with four of Ferdi De Ville’s master 
students in EU Studies (2014). He would like to thank Peter Hyndrikx, Robin Vandekeybus, Helena Verhoeven and 
Tom Vermeersch for their assistance. 
2 
Observers point to the relatively good fiscal and competitive position of creditor Member States, incentivizing 
strategies focused on ‘self-help’ (f.e. Donnelly 2014), the naked costs of relaxing fiscal constraints (Dyson 2012), the 
export-led growth structure of creditor Member State economies (Hall 2013; Iversen & Soskice forthcoming), 
unanimity rules enhancing the powers of veto players (Scharpf 2011), as well as the incongruity between Member 
State political economies, which require very different monetary regimes (Höpner & Schafer 2011; Hall 2014). 
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In this paper, based on a survey among euro area academic experts, we suggest an 
ideational explanation based on conflicting epistemic communities, providing Eurozone policy-
makers with contradictory crisis interpretations and consequently, clashing policy advice. 
Crucially, academics from the key creditor Eurozone Member State, Germany, assume an outlier 
position. Ideational perspectives point to an underlying clash between different economic policy 
ideas: both beliefs on the appropriate goals and instruments of economic policy, as well as core 
causal beliefs on the functioning of the economy.  
It has been noted by a number of critical observers such as Paul Krugman and Paul De 
Grauwe that key policy-makers in the European Union (EU) (most notably within the European 
Commission and its Directorate-General of Economic and Financial Affairs, the European 
Central Bank (ECB) and Germany, sometimes together called the Brussels-Frankfurt-Berlin 
consensus, cfr. De Grauwe 2006) believe that the austerity-cum-structural reform agenda is the 
most, and arguably only, sensible and sustainable solution to the crisis. This interpretation of the 
crisis holds that it has brought to light that some euro area economies are burdened with 
unsustainable government debt, which has a negative effect on growth (based on research by 
Reinhart and Rogoff 2010, since then questioned). They believe that fiscal consolidation will 
restore confidence (called the ‘confidence fairy tale’ by their critics) among investors and is thus 
key to restore growth. They also suspect that southern euro area economies, but all European 
economies by extension, are inhibited by rigid labour markets and unsustainable welfare state 
arrangements. Thus, austerity has to be accompanied by structural reforms to jump-start growth 
and ensure it in the future. On the other hand, the crisis has seen the reappearance of 
(neo)Keynesians who believe that a crisis, and private deleveraging as a consequence of this, 
needs to be offset by fiscal and monetary expansion to restore full employment, which will 
eventually ease debt reduction.  
This disagreement between neoclassical and neo-Keynesian economists is focused mostly 
on the short-term crisis response (see supra). With regard to the mid- to long-term reform of 
EMU, the conflict is more between ordoliberals, who believe that an EMU based on strict and 
enforceable rules (a stability union) is sustainable and that all instruments that install solidarity in 
the euro area (a transfer union) will lead to moral hazard, and others (euro-federalists) who 
believe that monetary union cannot survive without also being a fiscal and political union. This 
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difference has alternatively been described as ‘rules versus discretion’ (e.g. Wyplosz 2006: 
229ff). Of course this distinction between neo-Keynesians versus neo-classicists (that focus on 
short-term crisis management policy prescriptions) and ordoliberals versus federalists (that have 
different opinions about how the EMU should be governed in general, hence in the long term) is 
not entirely clear-cut. Ordoliberals tend to side with neo-classicists that strict rules on budget 
balances should reign in politician’s deficit bias, while neo-Keynesians will concur with euro-
federalists that a centralized European entity should avail of a significant budget to deploy for 
counter-cyclical spending purposes.  
Many of these accounts have pointed to the dominance of a specific blend of ordoliberal 
and neoclassical economic policy ideas in Germany, the largest creditor Member State in the 
Eurozone crisis and thus, the key veto player in the context of EMU reform.  Indeed, the German 
position during the crisis has regularly been described as consistent with the longstanding 
dominance of the economic orthodoxy of ordoliberalism in the country since the second world 
war and the economic policies of Ludwig Erhard (e.g. Newman 2010; Dullien and Guérot 2012). 
Ordoliberalism can be defined as an intellectual tradition whose central tenet is that: 
“[...]governments should regulate markets in such a way that the market outcome 
approximates the theoretical outcome in a perfectly competitive market (in which none of 
the actors are able to influence the price of goods and services). Ordoliberalism differs 
from other schools of liberalism (including the neo-liberalism predominant in the Anglo-
Saxon world) in that it places a greater emphasis on preventing cartels and monopolies. 
At the same time, like neo-liberalism, ordoliberalism opposes intervention into the normal 
course of the economy. For example, it rejects the use of expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies to stabilize the business cycle in a recession and is, in that sense, anti-
Keynesian (Dullien and Guérot 2012: 2).”  
Ordoliberalism, with its emphasis on a rule-based, hands-off approach to fiscal policy and 
the importance of moral hazard, is said to have influenced the economic world-view of the 
German public (Schieder 2014), media (Dullien 2008), academics and policy-makers (Dullien & 
Guérot 2012; Byth 2013).  These observations point to a specific explanation of the policy 
reaction to the Euro crisis: limited and imbalanced EMU reform can be traced back to an 
underlying divergence in economic policy ideas, particularly between Germany and other 
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Member States. This indicates the existence of clashing epistemic communities, based in different 
Eurozone Member States. 
Haas (1992: 3) defines epistemic communities as follows:  
“An epistemic community is a network of professionals from a variety of disciplines and 
backgrounds. They have (1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which 
provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members; (2) shared 
causal beliefs, which are derived from their analyses of practices leading or contributing 
to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis of 
elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; 
(3) shared notions of validity – that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for 
weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of expertise; and (4) a common policy 
enterprise – that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which 
their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human 
welfare will be enhanced as a consequence.” 
In this paper, our focus lies on the second and fourth characteristics. In effect, our survey 
investigates whether euro area academic experts share a mutual policy enterprise, grounded in a 
common set of economic policy ideas. We argue that in Germany, an epistemic community, 
consisting of members of the political, academic and media elite, share a specific set of economic 
policy ideas: beliefs on appropriate goals and instruments, as well as underlying causal beliefs on 
the functioning of economic policy.  This epistemic community is concentrated in but not limited 
to Germany (Pühringer & Hirte 2013). 
Academic experts can be considered to be crucial actors as they constitute one important 
faction of an epistemic community (e.g. Haas 1989; Verdun 1999) that influences political and 
public debate on the future of the euro area. With Denzau and North (1994), Blyth (2002) and 
Rodrik (2014), we find it likely that decision-makers inhabit a world marked by ‘Knightian 
uncertainty’. Because of incomplete information, decision-makers cannot know for certain which 
causal beliefs related to the functioning of the economy and interpretations of economic events 
are correct. This view is certainly more likely to be valid in the context of a highly complex 
economic catastrophe such as the Eurozone crisis, of which every possible causal narrative 
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contains a multitude of moving parts, actors and processes. In this context, it is doubtful that the 
public or political decision-makers have a clear and distinct idea of policy options maximizing 
either their own, their Member State’s or the Eurozone’s welfare. In a context such as this, Haas 
(1992: 13) emphasizes the importance of academic experts at the expense of interests groups and 
social movements:  
 “Without the help of experts, they [governments] risk making choices that not only 
ignore the interlinkages with other issues, but also highly discount the uncertain future” 
 
Next to organized interests, academic experts can be considered the key creators and 
disseminators of knowledge relevant to policy makers (Haas, 1992).
3
 Against this background, 
academic experts will influence how decision-makers understand the short- and long-term 
consequences of policy proposals and whether these are consistent with their preferences. Thus, 
academic experts influence how political decision-makers perceive their interests (Haas, 1992; 
Blyth, 2002; Rodrik, 2014).  
These experts may assume several roles in the policy process. They may cause policy-
makers to pursue new strategies, create new policy instruments or bring about a change in the 
dominant policy paradigm through provoking a shift in causal beliefs (Hall, 1992). Furthermore, 
the information provided can serve to legitimize certain policy reforms and/or serve as an 
instrument to attack opponents. A multitude of accounts emphasize that the potential roles of 
expert information essentially depend on the policy-making context. Expert information 
confronts differences in the structure of decision-making institutions, as well as ideological 
heritage (Kogut & Macpherson 2011: 20). In any case, expert-based opinions can be assumed to 
be more influential when there is unanimity across a scientific community (Haas 1992, Sabatier 
1999, Weible 2008, Kogut & Macpherson 2011, Farrell & Quiggin 2012).  
                                                          
3
This is not to argue only experts are relevant with regards to the creation, dissemination and promotion of policy 
knowledge or economic ideas. Rather, Haas was pointing to a gap in the literature: there is more to the policy-
making process than the clash of material interests in the context of institutional hurdles, more actors are relevant 
besides interest groups and political elites. See Dunlop (2000). 
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Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that 1) a greater degree of consensus among 
academic experts about needed reforms to the EMU policy framework will increase the chance of 
far-reaching reform and 2) inversely, significant disagreement among academic experts from 
different Member States will lead to conflicts between Member States on the apt policy 
orientation of EMU and thus, on EMU reform. Thus, instead of mapping politicians’ (or public 
opinions’) positions in this discussion, this paper takes aim at the positions of euro area 
academics on EMU reform, particularly the difference between German academics and others.  
The paper proceeds as follows: in the following section, the rationale behind our survey 
and the make-up of the population is discussed. Next, our results will be presented, as well as the 
most salient patterns emerging from our data. Subsequently, we discuss the fit of our results to 
the wider literature on German economics and trace plausible interpretations for those results. We 
argue that German academics, particularly economists, are likely to have significantly influenced 
the policy preferences of their policy elite. Finally, we reflect on what this tells us about the 
future of the euro area.  
The survey and population 
Besides criticizing the features and effects of hitherto rescue operations, many observers have 
called to move beyond crisis management and consider more fundamental institutional fixes to 
put EMU on a sustainable footing.
4
 Also, European policy-makers have started to realize the need 
for more radical reform of the EMU’s architecture. Both European Council President Van 
Rompuy and the European Commission have tabled ambitious and relatively detailed roadmaps 
for the completion of EMU, but the Member States have only reluctantly acted on them.  
The new President of the European Commission has named establishing ‘a deeper and 
fairer economic and monetary union’, based on the aforementioned four presidents’ report (Van 
                                                          
4
 Examples include Leonard (2011) advocating ‘a quasi-finance ministry to set and enforce fiscal rules; the ability to 
raise its own resources; common banking supervision, regulation and deposit insurance; common representation in 
international institutions; and a mechanism for ensuring the democratic legitimacy of these processes’ and Tilford 
(2011) arguing for ‘partial mutualisation of sovereign borrowing costs, via the adoption of a common bond … the 
adoption of a eurozone-wide backstop for the banking sector … growth-orientated macroeconomic policy: the 
European Central Bank needs a broader mandate, member states’ fiscal policy must be co-ordinated, and trade 
balances must be narrowed symmetrically … finally, the participating economies must agree to deepen the EU’s 
single market’.  
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Rompuy, 2012) and the Commission’s report as one of his priorities (Juncker 2014: 6-7). This 
commitment was reiterated and concretized at a recent European Council (Juncker et al. 2015: 8-
9).
5
 
At the time of writing, only a very limited, and according to many observers inadequate, 
banking union has been agreed upon (Beck, 2013; Véron & Wolff, 2013). Other proposals that 
have been put under such headings as ‘economic union’, ‘fiscal union’, ‘social union’ and 
‘political union’ have not been the subject of any real discussion. 
We have selected twelve reform proposals from two aforementioned documents, the 
essential official proposals on EMU reform: the ‘Van Rompuy’ or ‘Four Presidents’ report 
‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’ and the European Commission’s ‘A 
blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union: Launching a European debate’. 
as well as from a number of other publications on EMU reform by several of the most well-
known EU think tanks (such as CEPS and Bruegel).
6
 We have formulated these proposals, in line 
with official communications, as follows, and each time accompanied them with a brief, neutrally 
formulated definition of the proposal:  
1. The EMU should have a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) (which will be in charge of 
the restructuring and resolution of banks within the Member States participating in the 
banking union)  
                                                          
5
 The document has been prepared by Juncker, Dijsselbloem, Tusk and Draghi and points to the 2012 Van Rompuy 
and European Commission blueprints as the essential documents setting out a roadmap to a stronger economic 
governance. The document closes with a succinct observation: “The euro area has not recovered from the crisis in the 
same way as the U.S., which might point to the fact that an incomplete monetary union adjusts much slower than one 
with a more complete institutional setup in place.” 
6
 We are conscious of the fact that this is not the definitive list of policy options to address the Eurozone crisis. The 
proposals in this paper are indeed mainly part of the literature that asks the question what it would take to make the 
Eurozone into an optimal currency area. They are proposals specifically aimed at constructing additional EMU 
institutions or changing their functioning. Short-term proposals that focus on issues such as the coordination of wage 
growth, raising inflation in the core, the coordination of stimulus packages or medium to long-term proposals such as 
new and clear bankruptcy rules for Eurozone states, have been ignored in this survey (see supra). To enhance the 
political feasibility of the proposals included hereafter, we have focused on institutional proposals and proposals 
emanating from EU institutions. 
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2. The EMU should have a single deposit insurance scheme (which will operate at the 
banking union level and will reimburse from a common fund a limited amount of deposits 
to depositors in participating Member States in the case of bank failures)  
3. The EMU should have contractual arrangements accompanied by financial support (Such 
a contract would bind a member state in adopting structural reforms, while some EU 
financial support may be granted to the contracting Member State. They would be 
mutually agreed between the Commission and Member States and would involve all euro 
area Member States) 
4. The EMU should have a full-time Eurogroup president (A full-time Eurogroup president 
would be a chairman for the main forum of the single currency (composed of the euro 
area’s ministers of finance) named for a fixed period and work full-time without other 
responsibilities)  
5. The EMU should have a euro committee in the EP with greater powers (A euro 
committee should be set up in the European Parliament, which should be granted co-
decision-making power in matters of economic governance (such as in the application of 
the European Semester)) 
6. The EMU should have an automatic stabilization mechanism at the euro area level (Under 
an automatic stabilization mechanism, Member States would pay into the scheme when 
their business cycle position is better than the euro area average and would receive funds 
when their business cycle position is weaker than average) 
7. The EMU should have a single external representation of the euro area (A single external 
representation of the euro area would consist of creating a single-member position on 
multilateral institutions such as the IMF and the G-20) 
8. The EMU should change the mandate of the ECB (The EMU should put growth and 
employment along with price stability as the ECB’s primary objectives) 
9. The EU should have a directly-elected Commission President (A directly-elected 
President would be elected by the European voters in a two-ballot contest (along the lines 
of the French model) or via an electoral college (along the lines of the American model))  
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10. The EU should have issuance of common debt (The common issuance of sovereign debt 
would mean a pooling of sovereign issuance among the euro area Member States and the 
sharing of associated revenue flows and debt-servicing costs) 
11. The EMU should have enforceable social and employment indicators integrated in the 
European Semester (The European Semester is the yearly cycle of economic policy 
coordination of the EU. Each year the European Commission undertakes a detailed 
analysis of EU Member States’ programmes of economic and structural reforms and 
provides them with recommendations for the next 12-18 months)  
12. The EMU should have a proper fiscal capacity for the euro area governed by an EMU 
treasury (A proper fiscal capacity means the EMU would have a relevant budget based on 
own tax resources with a Treasury in command)  
To analyse the opinion of academics on these EMU reform proposals, we have identified 
more than 900 academics working in one of the 18 euro area Member States, in a Faculty of 
Economics, Political Science or Law. Thereby the survey population was explicitly limited to 
academic experts on euro area policy. Belonging to the population could be indicated by having 
EMU listed among research interests, having published peer-reviewed papers on topics and/or 
teaching activities related to EMU. A control question, gauging if respondents considered their 
research relevant to EMU policy, was included in the survey. Most respondents consider their 
research as somewhat (a third) to closely (a fourth) related to EMU, with respondents considering 
their work a little or very closely related to the topic of the survey both representing one fifth of 
the respondents. Only 5% of respondents (11) indicated that their research had little to do with 
EMU. As there was no correlation between respondents’ response to the control question and 
their policy preferences, their answers remain in our data-set.  
We have intentionally chosen to exclusively survey academics at public universities, 
rather than academics active within policy-making institutions, think tanks, consulting firms or 
non-profits, as these face divergent incentives or conflicts of interest (Weible, 2008: 616). 
Moreover, Member States possess different knowledge regimes (Campbell & Pedersen 2014), 
which renders other potential criteria of inclusion exceedingly complex. Our online survey that 
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ran in December 2013 and January 2014 has been fully completed by 252 respondents, resulting 
in a response rate of 27.8%.  
Table 1: Respondents by nationality and academic major 
 
Economic
s 
Law Politics Other Total 
Austria 4 0 2 0 6 
Belgium 11 3 5 0 19 
Cyprus 1 0 2 0 3 
Estonia 1 1 0 0 2 
Finland 0 0 5 0 5 
France 29 3 2 0 34 
Germany 14 1 26 0 41 
Greece 10 2 6 0 18 
Italy 22 9 7 1 39 
Ireland 1 0 1 0 2 
Latvia 0 0 0 1 1 
Luxembourg 0 0 1 0 1 
Malta 3 1 1 0 5 
Netherlands 8 2 3 1 14 
Portugal 7 0 2 0 9 
Slovakia 1 0 2 1 4 
Slovenia 10 6 1 0 17 
Spain 1 4 10 2 17 
Other 3 0 8 0 11 
Total 126 32 84 6 248 
Source: survey data, representation by the authors 
Of these, German (16,3% of respondents), Italian (15,5%) and French (13,5%) 
respondents are most represented, followed by Belgian (7,5%), Greek (7,3%), as well as 
Slovenian (6,7%), and Spanish (6,7%) academics. Both German and Spanish academics are 
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significantly underrepresented. Belgian, Greek and Slovenian academics are overrepresented. As 
we have reasons to suspect German academics to have more negative opinions toward proposals 
increasing moral hazard and/or increasing the scope of discretionary policy, this would tend to 
bias the aggregate results in the favour of approval.   
When we differentiate between the periphery (Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Ireland, 
Malta, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain) and the core (Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Germany, 
Latvia, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and Slovakia),
7
 the periphery is represented by 58,1% of 
respondents, the core by 37,5%. If a cleavage between periphery and core Member States shows 
up in the results, this divide would bias aggregate opinion in the favor of periphery Member 
States.  
With regards to the respondents’ academic field, economists represent half, followed by 
political scientists with a third and law scholars with one eighth. Different academic majors are 
overrepresented in the respondents group of different Member States. In the periphery, Italy and 
Greece stay fairly close to the average representation of economists (56,4% and 55,6%). In 
France and Portugal, however, fully 85,3% and 77,8% of academics work in an economics 
department. Political scientists are overrepresented in Spain with 58,8%. On the core side of the 
great Eurozone divide, Austrian and Dutch economists (66,6% and 57,1%) are overrepresented, 
as well as German political scientists with 63,4%, whereas in Finland only political scientists 
replied. Because of this over- and underrepresentation of specific majors within certain countries, 
the external validity of the opinion of most specifics subsets of academic experts is doubtful. In 
                                                          
7
 Categorization into core and periphery Member States is a contentious issue, as are the labels themselves. Here, 
these labels are not used to imply a geographical division, nor a strict juxtaposition of creditor and debtor Member 
States. The labels are employed here to reflect the relative ‘hawkish’ or ‘dovish’ position of respective governments. 
We have grouped Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia to belong to the ‘core’ because of the ‘hawkish’ position of their 
governments during the euro crisis that lean towards the position of those governments traditionally conceived as the 
core (the so-called FANGs: Finland, Austria, the Netherlands and Germany). In this paper, France and Slovenia are 
classified as periphery Member States. In 2012/2013, Slovenia was considered likely to be the next Member State in 
the crosshairs of the financial markets, after Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. France has certainly been a 
‘core’ country in the context of the creation of EMU. Franco-German compromises have been the driving forces 
behind much of the shaping of its institutions, before and after the advent of the Eurozone crises (Schild, 2013). 
However, since the French presidential elections won by Hollande in 2012, compromises were characterized by a 
‘proxy logic in which France and Germany […] strike bilateral compromises acceptable to other member states that 
feel their own interests are represented by either France or Germany’ (Schild, 2013: 1). France and Germany have 
often stood on opposite sides of the divide described above.  
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this paper, we will focus on the most salient cleavage: the polarization between German 
respondents and all others. In this context, we will zoom in on German economists. Additionally, 
we offer a brief discussion of aggregate opinion and the core-periphery divide. 
Results  
In what follows, we present our most salient results. Two significant divides emerge from the 
data: between Germany and all others and between the core and periphery. Although the 
academic background of respondents or the closeness of their research to the issue of Economic 
and Monetary Union did not result in significant differences in their opinion on EMU reform in 
aggregate, when analysed per Member State, academic background does influence opinion, most 
significantly in Germany.  
The last row in the following table shows an average approval rate for the twelve 
proposals for each of the nationalities. Approval for reform of EMU is lowest in Germany and 
Finland,
8
 two countries whose policy-makers are most resistant towards adjusting the EMU 
institutional structure through increased fiscal integration and a more symmetric burden-sharing. 
In Belgium and the Netherlands, support is above 60%. Malta, Austria and Portugal show support 
rates for EMU reform of between 70 and 80%. Five countries have an average of more than 80% 
support: France, Spain, Cyprus, Italy and Slovenia. One country has an average of more than 
90% support on average: Greece. It is remarkably clear that the reform proposals for EMU are 
supported the most by academics from the Southern European countries. In all of the so-called 
GIPS (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain), approval of the reform proposals is very high, as well as in 
Slovenia. 
                                                          
8
 As Finland only has 5 respondents, one has to be cautious about the external validity of the Finnish results.  
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Table 1 Support for reform proposals by nationality 
 AT BE CY FI FR DE EL IT MT NL PT SI ES 
1. Single Resolution Mechanism 
100 94 100 80 91 88 88 85 80 79 78 88 100 
2. Single Deposit Insurance Scheme    
83 79 100 40 85 59 100 92 75 100 89 88 94 
6. Automatic stabilization mechanism  
83 79 100 60 91 61 100 85 60 69 78 94 87 
12. Fiscal capacity  
83 84 100 60 97 49 94 92 80 79 67 88 88 
10. Issuance of common debt    
67 74 100 40 94 46 100 90 80 71 78 94 88 
5. Euro committee in the EP  
100 67 100 40 91 65 88 81 40 67 56 65 88 
7. Single external representation  
83 53 67 40 85 54 89 85 100 57 78 77 94 
3. Contractual arrangements  
83 56 67 60 75 68 83 70 100 43 67 88 88 
7. Social and employment indicators  
67 53 67 60 88 45 94 80 40 21 67 94 88 
4. Full-time Eurogroup president    
50 53 100 20 76 59 78 68 100 46 56 88 77 
9. Directly elected Commission president  
33 58 100 60 76 51 94 87 60 39 67 56 88 
8. Change mandate of ECB     
33 63 33 60 88 32 100 77 60 71 78 75 71 
Average 
72 68 86 52 86 56 92 83 73 62 71 83 88 
yellow = banking union; red = fiscal union; green = political union; blue = other.  Source: survey data, representation by the authors
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German deviance is illustrated when we differentiate between Germany, the periphery 
(Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain) and the core 
excluding Germany (Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and 
Slovakia). It shows the clear outlier position of German academics, as well as notable differences 
between academics from the periphery and the core, even if we leave Germany out of this group. 
What is clear is that academics from all Member States agree strongly on the need for a SRM for 
banks,
9
 which is the only reform proposal where German support is not significantly lower 
compared to other Member States. After the SRM, German support is highest for contractual 
arrangements, whereas this proposal finishes third-to-last in aggregate. 
Fittingly, this is a proposal that originates from within the German government and 
clearly fits within the ‘stability union’ view of an EMU governed by enforceable rules (see 
supra). On a number of proposals, most notably within fiscal union (fiscal capacity and issuance 
of common debt) and on changing the ECB mandate, German academics appear relatively 
isolated. Another surprising finding is that there is relatively little support among German 
academics for political integration (in descending order of opposition: full-time Eurogroup 
President, directly-elected Commission President, single external representation of the euro area, 
and euro committee with greater powers in the European Parliament), notwithstanding the 
position of the German government that more political integration in the euro area is needed 
before fiscal integration is legitimately feasible (which might of course be a tactical position to 
delay fiscal integration). It is also remarkable that periphery countries oppose a full-time 
Eurogroup President, which might be ascribed to the fact that this figure (first Jean-Claude 
Juncker, then Jeroen Dijsselbloem) has become one of the ‘faces’ of the austerity approach to the 
crisis.  
                                                          
9
 We were not able to ask them about the modalities of this reform; the same disclaimer applies to the other 
proposals. 
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Figure 1 Support for reform proposals among academics from Germany, the periphery and 
the core 
Source: survey data, representation by the authors 
In spite of strong German opposition, all reform proposals are supported by at least two 
thirds of respondents. In order to further illustrate the extent of German deviance, we present 
aggregate opinion in the following table, by descending intensity of support.
10
 We can see that 
the synthesized and weighted results strongly overlap. Only for the issuance of common debt a 
proposal drops significantly in the ranking when using the weighted number. This can mainly be 
traced back to strong opposition by German academics.  
                                                          
10
All three response categories expressing disagreement (strongly disagree, disagree and slightly disagree) have been 
coded as ‘disagree’ and those that opted for one of the three categories indicating approval (slightly agree, agree, 
strongly agree) as ‘agree’. The final column is a weighted number (strongly disagree = -3, disagree = -2, slightly 
disagree = -1, slightly agree = +1, agree = +2, strongly agree = +3).  Hence, if for a certain proposal 40% of 
respondents have chosen ‘strongly agree’ , 30% ‘agree’, 20% ‘slightly agree’ and 10% have chosen ‘disagree’, the 
weighted result would be: (40*3) + (30*2) + (20*1) + (10*-2)=180, out of a maximum weighted score of 300.   
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Table 3 Average support for EMU reform proposals 
 Disagree (%) Agree (%) Weighted 
1.Single Resolution Mechanism 6,8 85,7 187,2 
2. Single Deposit Insurance Scheme 11,2 81,7 166 
6. Automatic Stabilization Mechanism 15,9 79,8 150,8 
12. Fiscal Capacity 17,5 80,5 149,8 
7. Single External Representation Euro 
Area 15,9 75 144,8 
5. Euro Committee in EP with Greater 
Powers  17,1 72,6 132,5 
10. Issuance of Common Debt  20,5 77,5 126,3 
11. Enforceable Social Indicators 24,6 68,7 111,6 
4. Full-time Eurogroup President    21,4 67 111 
3. Contractual Arrangements 19,1 70,7 102,4 
9. Directly Elected Commission 
President    23,8 67,1 99,6 
8. Change Mandate of ECB     27 67 97,5 
Source: survey data, representation by the authors 
Where is this German opposition coming from? Striking disagreements rear their head 
when we delve deeper into the composition of German opinion by academic major. In the 
following table, we render their opinions on all included proposals, ranked according to the 
proposals most favored by German academics.  
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Table 4 Support for reform proposals among German academics, by academic major
11
 
  
Economics 
% 
Weighted Politics 
% 
Weighted 
1. Single Resolution Mechanism 79 150,2 96 168,3 
3. Contractual arrangements  70 50,1 75 134,7 
7. Single External representation Euro Area 58 28,6 58 54,0 
9. Directly Elected Commission president    50 -28,4 56 23,1 
4. Full-time Eurogroup president    42 -35,5 72 99,9 
5. Euro committee in EP with Greater Powers 36 -50,0 84 157,7 
2. Single Deposit Insurance Scheme    36 -93,2 74 100,3 
6. Automatic Stabilization Mechanism  36 -107,3 83 119,1 
7. Enforceable Social Indicators  25 -100,1 58 30,8 
12. Fiscal Capacity  21 -143,2 61 73,2 
10. Issuance of Common Debt    21 -178,7 58 26,9 
8. Change Mandate of ECB     7 -235,7 42 -7,8 
Average 40 -61,3 68 67,6 
Source: survey data, representation by the authors 
As noted above, Germany seems the primary bulwark of opposition against the proposal 
suggesting that the ECB needs an expanded mandate. When analyzing German opinion by 
academic major, it is apparent that German opposition can be traced back primarily to 
economists. A decisive 92,8% of German economists disagrees with the statement that the ECB 
                                                          
11
 German law majors were not included in this graph, because of the low number of law major respondents.  
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mandate should be expanded to include growth and employment. Virtually all German support 
for this proposal is to be found in the ranks of political scientists. Whilst a small majority of them 
(53,9 %) opposes tinkering with the ECB mandate, 42,3 % approves. Even still, this is the least 
popular proposal of both German economists and political scientists.  
By contrast, the SRM is remarkably popular, receiving four fifths of economists’ support 
and 96% of political scientists. The second and third most popular proposals for political 
scientists are the introduction of a powerful Euro Committee and the creation of an automatic 
stabilization mechanism, both with support of over 80%. This forms a sharp contrast to the 
economists, among whom the respective proposals gather a mere 36%.  
Even still, these proposals are not among the least favoured proposals among economists. 
Generally, proposals aimed at ‘political union’ received mixed support by economists. German 
economists are especially squeamish on proposals that aim for ‘fiscal union’ and ‘social union’. 
In general, support for ideas associated with neo-Keynesian thought, such as those emphasizing 
fiscal integration, receive little support among German economists. Among these proposals, rule-
based proposals, such as the implementation of an automatic fiscal stabilizer, gather more 
support than discretionary measures. The only proposal targeting ‘social union’ that enjoys 
majority support suggests introducing contractual arrangements, which would increase reform 
pressure on periphery Member States and only increase fiscal liabilities up to a certain and 
predictable point. On average, support amongst economists for the proposals at hand reaches only 
40 percent. For politics majors, the corresponding number is a cool 68%.  
Weighing results increases the divergence of both groups. There is agreement on the 
SRM, with both majors expressing strong support for the institution. Some differences become 
rather more marked. For example, a gap of five percent on contractual arrangements suddenly 
turns to 84,6 points, primarily caused by the preference intensity of those economists opposing 
such arrangements, presumably rejecting more fiscal exposure. What can we conclude from these 
differences? First, opinion amongst politics majors is more favourable, albeit still more negative 
than aggregate academic opinion throughout the Eurozone. Second, dependent on their academic 
major, German academics have divergent opinions. The only proposals that gather comfortable 
majority support (>60%) within both groups are the SRM and the introduction of contractual 
arrangements. 
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This German exceptionalism is further illustrated when comparing the opinions of 
German and other economists. In what follows, we compare the opinion of German economists 
with those of French economists. It can be considered exceptionally relevant to gauge the 
difference between the opinions of economic experts advising both countries: the two biggest 
economies in the Eurozone and constituents of the Franco-German axis, whose compromises 
have driven much of European monetary integration over the past three decades (see supra).  
 
 Table 5 Support for reform proposals among German and French economists 
 Germany Weighted France Weighted 
1. Single Resolution Mechanism 79 150,2 100 206,8 
3. Contractual arrangements  69 50,1 80 106,9 
7. Single External representation Euro Area 58 28,6 89 190 
9. Directly Elected Commission president    50 -28,4 85 165,6 
4. Full-time Eurogroup president    42 -35,5 85 165,5 
5. Euro committee in EP with Greater Powers 38 -42,9 84 179,3 
2. Single Deposit Insurance Scheme    36 -93,2 92 172,5 
6. Automatic Stabilization Mechanism  36 -107,3 96 210,5 
7. Enforceable Social Indicators  25 -100,1 93 206,9 
12. Fiscal Capacity  21 -143,2 100 234,5 
10. Issuance of Common Debt    21 -178,7 93 196,6 
8. Change Mandate of ECB     7 -235,7 90 210,3 
Average 40 -61,3 91 187,1 
Source: survey data, representation by the authors 
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The polarization between French and German economists is stunning. Their opinions 
diverse by a few orders of magnitude compared to the differences of opinion between academic 
majors within Germany. All propositions are accepted by a significant majority of French 
economists, whose least favourite proposal is the usage of contractual arrangement with 80%, a 
scheme for which German economists have shown great appreciation. This amount of support 
dwarves German economists’ most favourite proposal, the implementation of a SRM. The 
cleavage becomes ever wider when taking account of preference intensity. Factoring in the 
intensity of the opinions of German economists, support for all but three proposals veers into 
negative territory. Mainly because of the firmness of opposition against those proposals 
addressing social and fiscal union, average weighted support drops to -61,3.  Due to their strong 
support for the same category of propositions, French backing rises to 187,1. The proposals, on 
which French and German economists differ most fundamentally, are those in the context of 
fiscal and social union. The top 4 of proposals favoured by French economists all aim for fiscal 
and social union. The opposite is true for German economists. Specifically, whereas changing the 
ECB mandate was German economists’ least favourite proposal, their French counterparts 
vehemently disagree. Changing the ECB mandate is the second priority on their list. 
Interpreting patterns in the data 
In the following, we will turn to a discussion of the most striking finding in our data: German 
exceptionalism, which can be traced back to the outlier preferences of economists. Is the outlier 
pattern consistent with other findings on the policy preferences of German economists and their 
influence on policy-making? How can this outlier position be explained?  In this section, we will 
focus on general observations that can be made about the German economics profession as such, 
rather than the statements of a few economists with a high public profile. After this we will 
introduce a number of causal narratives consistent with the patterns emerging from our data. In 
order to gauge the likelihood of these explanations, we will focus on the political system and 
knowledge regime of Germany, the key actor in the reform of European economic governance 
and the outlier in our data. Our analysis will proceed by matter of comparison with France, which 
can be considered the representative of a contrasting political-economic model (Pisani-Ferry 
2006; Schild 2013) and the second pendant of the “deliberative intergovernmentalist” mode of 
governance that has driven monetary integration during the past decades (Pütter 2012).  
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German exceptionalism  
This study shows us that no (new) international consensus has been formed among Euro 
area academics following the crisis, as had been the case after the economic crisis of the late 
1970s - early 1980s that gave rise to the hegemony of a new neo-liberal, or Washington, 
consensus (cfr. Blyth 2002). The data displays the remarkable outlier position of German 
economists, whose opinions were in stark contrast to all others, particulary academics hailing 
from periphery member states. Our analysis of the divergence between the opinions of French 
and German economists, the constituents of the illustrious axis driving much of economic and 
monetary integration, revealed strikingly different opinions on what reforms are appropriate and 
necessary.  
As we have noted earlier, it is not claimed that these results are exhaustively 
representative of the wider expert community in Germany and France. If these results were fully 
representative, there would be no currents of neoclassical/supply-side economics or 
Euroscepticism present in French expert communities or no demand-side views on the Eurozone 
problems in Germany. This is not the case. Moreover, we expect the French results to be biased 
towards Keynesian ideas due to the absence of private universities in our survey, where these are 
more likely not to be dominant (Fourcade, 2009). What we do posit is that these findings 
empirically substantiate the literatures on the outlier position of Germany and the differing 
attitudes of German and French economists in the context of the construction of EMU economic 
governance and the influence of economic ideas on EMU reform in the wake of the crisis (e.g. 
Dullien & Guerot 2012; Dullien 2013; Young & Semmler 2011; Verdun 2012; Blyth 2013; 
Farrell & Quiggin 2012). With the aforementioned authors, we posit that it is a different but 
compatible tradition of economic thought to neoliberalism, ordoliberalism, that informs the 
German position and which might explain the outlier position of German economists in this 
survey (see supra).  
Within ordoliberalism, monetary and fiscal stability are seen as essential framework 
conditions for a functioning capitalist economy (Newman 2010: 156). Thus, policy 
instrumentalism and the rule of law is to be preferred above government discretion and radical 
reforms to EMU. Add to this the centrality of moral hazard in ordoliberal thinking, namely the 
fear that solidarity mechanisms will take away the incentives for sound economic policy-making 
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given by effective capitalism. This ordoliberal position is often articulated and defended in 
Germany against outside (mostly Anglo-Saxon) criticism on their Eurozone crisis approach by 
public intellectual economists such as Hans-Werner Sinn or Otmar Issing. In our survey, the 
strongest testament to the commitment of German economists to this ideational paradigm is the 
tough stance with regards to an EU fiscal capacity, the issuance of common debt and, especially, 
a broader ECB mandate. For German economists, this mandate, uploaded from the Bundesbank 
(Verdun 1999), is still beyond discussion. They stand firmly opposed to the majority opinion and 
even diverge significantly from those member states (Cyprus and Austria)
12
 joining them in 
opposing a change to the ECB mandate.  
Yet, this does not imply that the dominant mode of economic thought in Germany, nor its 
roots, can be identified as exclusively ordoliberal. For one, Bibow (2004) identifies the mismatch 
between central bank independence (CBI) and several tenets of pre-war ordoliberal thought. The 
Bundesbank’s independence came about through path dependence: the regional central banks and 
the Bundesbank, established before the federal government, gained public trust and were able to 
prevent political control. Its institutional position did not solely come about through the influence 
of the dominant economic ideas of the time. CBI only became a consensus position among 
German economists after its establishment. Furthermore, a recent survey has shown that German 
economists do not majoritarily identify as ordoliberals. Indeed, a solid 42% of German 
economists self-identify
13
 as neoclassical, with 37% identifiying with public choice, 24% as 
ordoliberals, 7% as supply-side economists, 5% as monetarists and a mere 12% with Keynesian 
economic thought (Frey et al. 2007). It is likely that the proportion of those identifiying as 
neoclassical economists will have risen since, as the majority of economists under 35 felt 
committed to neoclassicism, while Ordoliberalism and Keynesianism were overrepresented 
amidst economists over 55. Dullien & Guérot’s assessment (2012: 2-3) rings true: most 
economists may have been influenced by ordoliberal economic thought, but identify with 
neoclassicism. 
                                                          
12 Although these disapprove only by a margin of one respondent – Cyprus and Austria’s numbers are the result of 
returns by a low number of respondents. 
13
 It was possible for respondents to check multiple boxes, i.e. self-identification was not exclusive to one category.  
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Asked about the merits of counter-cyclical fiscal policy, respondents exhibited opinions 
which are not entirely consistent with the radical wing of neoclassicism, which sees no legitimate 
role for counter-cyclical fiscal policy: 55% agreed, with reservations, that fiscal policy can be 
useful. Interestingly, academic economists are overrepresented in the camp rejecting this 
statement.
14
 Regrettably, we possess no detailed knowledge of these reservations and the question 
does not survey opinions on the merits of discretionary fiscal policy. Moreover, the results are 
consistent with the observation that contractual arrangements are the only ‘social union’ proposal 
supported by a majority of German economists, as these would combine financial support with 
structural reforms, commonly understood as labour market flexibilization. The latter enjoy robust 
support in the survey: 76% support decentralization of collective bargaining, 63% support weaker 
dismissal protection. A majority disagrees with the assertion that unemployment is a cyclical 
problem. Seven out of ten supports constraining the economic power of labour unions.  
However, neoclassicism and ordoliberalism are no exclusive modes of economic thought. 
As we argued before, the tenets of neoclassical economics are mostly compatible with those of 
ordoliberal thought (Dullien & Guérot 2012). Both deny the need for counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy, emphasize moral hazard and the need for balanced budgets and price stability. Whilst 
ordoliberalism stresses the need for a strong state to create and enforce competitive markets, 
neoclassicism underscores unfettered free markets and fiscal restraint. The opposition to 
adjustments to the policy framework that would increase fiscal liabilities, such as the Single 
Deposit Guarantee Scheme, implement automatic counter-cyclical policy and hand sovereigns or 
the European level increased scope for discretionary fiscal policy, is consistent with both 
neoclassical and ordoliberal ideational commitments. Frey’s survey testifies to this assessment: 
80% of respondents agreed that neo-classical theory is central to finding solutions to economic 
policy problems. Only 17% rejected this statement, whereas only 47% supported this statement in 
1981. Thus, it is extremely likely that an overwhelming majority of ordoliberal economists 
approved.  
This stands in stark contrast to the French conception for a gouvernement économique, a 
politicized discretionary macroeconomic governance, centralized at the European level. This 
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 The population was composed of all members of the Verein für Socialpolitik. Economists at public universities, 
economic policy institutes, in government institutions, as well as in the private sector were included in the survey.  
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could contribute to the coordination of economic policies, an appropriate fiscal capacity for the 
Eurozone, as well as the possibility to ‘speak with one voice’  vis-à-vis its partners (Jabko 2014; 
Pisani-Ferry 2006). Additional pillars of the French conception of EMU are a growth-oriented 
European industrial policy, as well as strengthened financial regulation (Jamet 2011). Whatever 
its roots, there is an obvious and deep rift between the French and German conceptions of what 
monetary union entails. Although one may posit with Jabko (2011) that the slight overlap 
between French and German preferences has led to the mix of increased fiscal surveillance, 
macro-economic monitoring and permanent bail-out funds, the lack of far-reaching and coherent 
reform to EMU economic governance, as well as the results of this survey, confirm the 
continuing existence of this tension.  
There are copious reasons to suspect that the outlier position of German economics 
influences German media and thus, the perceptions of decision-makers. As a matter of course, 
German economics journalism has been found to be overwhelmingly stacked in the favour of 
mainstream opinion – and this for quite some time. From ’99 to ’04, the most cited German 
economists in the 40 leading print media, Hans-Werner Sinn and Bert Rurüp, two neoclassical 
economists, were found to be cited more often than the eight following economists (Dullien 
2008). This ideational monopoly continues to this day. The three most cited economists in the 
media, Sinn, Jörg Krämer and Michael Hüther, with a similarly neoclassical profile, gather more 
mentions in German print media than the following seven combined (Haucap & Thomas 2014: 
4). The same disproportionate influence of non-Keynesian economists can be observed when one 
looks at the economists cited by officials in ministries as influential: Hans-Werner Sinn, the most 
influential economist, gathers more mentions than all three Keynesians
15
 in the list, of which two 
are German: Bofinger, Krugman and Flassbeck. Truger’s (2004) observation that the “new New-
Keynesian mainstream” had not arrived in German academics, media, or politics, is still relevant.  
The plot thickens when considering the public advocacy of German and French 
economists in the context of the Euro-crisis. In 2011 four economists published the manifeste 
d’economistes atterrés (Askenazy et al.), a manifesto broadly espousing Keynesian and federalist 
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 Applying the denominator ‘Keynesian’ with reference to these authors, as well as ‘neoclassical’ to the economists 
drawn from Dullien (2008) and Haucap & Mödl (2014), is based on the authors’ own observations. They are not 
categorized as such in the cited studies.  
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viewpoints: against austerity, the reliance on disciplinary market forces and ‘the destruction of 
the European Social Model’. More then 800 economists signed the manifesto (Raim, 2011). 
Meanwhile, in Germany, economist public advocacy was oriented towards a rather different goal. 
The main controversy revolved around the legality of the bail-out packages, the creation of the 
permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM), a banking union and the legality of the 
unorthodox actions of the ECB. The main cleavage was between those attacking the 
administration’s policy in the financial and euro crises from the right and those defending it. 
Public advocacy by those economists advocating for an altogether different economic policy, i.e. 
outside of stability culture, was a trivial phenomenon (Pühringer & Hirte, 2013: 16-18). The 
cluster of public appeals that gathered most signatures (225), was the Plenum der Ökonomen, 
initiated by Bernd Lücke, founder of the Eurosceptic Alternative für Deutschland (AfD).  
Another public controversy in 2009 involving economists, the Ökonomenstreit, put 
traditionally-minded economic policy professors against the new generation of economists 
embedded in the international economics community. The issue was the loss of universitary 
professorships of economic policy, an academic tradtion in Germany, and their replacement by 
general chairs of economics with a broader focus. This conflict put mostly non-ranked, 
disproportionately ordoliberal, economists who decried the loss of political relevance of 
economics against neoclassical academics, of which a much larger proportion was internationally 
ranked. The latter posited that the traditional distinction between politically relevant and purely 
academic research was obsolete.
16
 This conflict, once more, points to the changing of the guard in 
German economics, tipping the scales towards neoclassical economists, focusing on publications 
in top American journals (Rothschild 2010; Pühringer & Hirte 2013: 14).  
Certainly, a few caveats require acknowledgement. Economic policy advice is 
increasingly performed by think thanks, lobbyists, economic policy insitutes and private 
consultancies (Pies et al. 2005). A majority of advisory contracts doled out by German ministries 
either goes to economic policy institutes or private consultancies (Haucap & Mödl 2013: 16). 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that policy advice is dominated by lawyers (Frey 2006, 
Reiermann 2014). This puts the significance of our results with regards to the influence of those 
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 83 economists signed a petition to demand the preservation of professorships of practical economic policy, of 
which only four were ranked. Of the 188 economists denouncing this demand, 47 were ranked.  
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polled on German policy-making into perspective. Then again, many of the academics connected 
to these institutes are also connected to a university, as are the economists in expert councils (see 
supra). The same holds true when one analyzes networks of influential economists in the manner 
of Pühringer & Hirte (2013: 23): all networks revolve around public universities, which points ot 
a connection between economic ‘schools’ and public advocacy. 
However, these caveats do not render the main conclusion from the discussion above 
invalid: the literature on the policy preferences of German economists is broadly consistent with 
the findings in our survey. Furthermore, we can consider it likely that the outlier position of 
German economists will significantly influence the orientation of economic policy-making, in 
this case in the completion of EMU. In the following, we turn to a discussion of the political 
relevance of our findings. For this, the central question is the direction of the causal chain: do 
academics influence the policy preferences of their government or vice versa? 
Do academics follow or influence their national position? 
The survey conducted for this paper does not allow us to establish definite causal explanations 
for academics’ and or politicians’ positions on EMU reform,17 but we can trace which narratives 
are consistent with our results. A main finding of this study is that the rift, on national lines, 
between the positions of academics on reform proposals to EMU seems to be close to the divide 
between the policy preferences of the governing coalitions of EMU member states.
18
 Academics 
from periphery member states are more positive on the proposals in our survey compared to core 
member state academics, with German academics occupying an outlier position.  
Thus, we can establish that the data are not consistent with a narrative in which there is no 
relationship between national academics’ and national politicians’ EMU reform opinions. A 
rather unlikely explanation for this correlation would be that academics blindly reflect the 
position of the governing coalition of their country. It is doubtful that, as a rule, knowledgeable, 
independent academics would simply mimic their governments’ standpoints in an anonymous 
survey, especially as these academics are less subject to the institutional rigidities of experts 
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 This does not mean a more rigorous examination of the data may not help us gauge the significance of the patterns 
in our data. See supra, footnote 2.  
18
 As described by the likes of Dyson (2012).  
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active in policy-making institutions (Campbell & Pedersen 2014). It is possible that some 
academics, embedded in Eurozone Member State societies, have come to adopt an opinion based 
on (perceived) national interests. For example, periphery member states, doing relatively worse 
economically, would enjoy the net benefits of a ‘social union’, more fiscal solidarity, or an 
expanded ECB mandate. Contrarily, the liabilities of core member states are larger, and will tend 
to increase as a result of proposed reforms (Dyson 2012). However, this argument by itself 
cannot account for the dissidence of German economists, as German liabilities relative to GDP, 
in the context of the creation of the various bail-out packages and bail-out funds, are smaller than 
those of many other core and periphery member states (Schieder 2014: 26). An element of 
ideational commitment, different causal beliefs or perception seems necessary to explain the 
observed variation. For example, it is likely that economists will be influenced to some degree by 
the prevailing position on EMU reform in their country, as expressed through dominant media 
narratives or opinion polls. 
Another, in our view more plausible, interpretation is that influence runs the other way 
around. Academics influence their governments’ position, as well as general public opinion in 
their country through participation in public debates, direct economic advice to and involvement 
with decision-makers and other political actors such as think thanks, interest groups and political 
parties (Dunlop 2000). This pattern of influence would be consistent with an ‘epistemic 
community’ perspective (see supra) that stresses the role of academic experts as the preeminent 
creators and disseminators of policy knowledge. In this view, academics’ opinions do not 
primarily depend on national interests, they provide the ideas that serve as a ‘motivating source 
of national interests’ (Haas 1990: 349). Other constituent members of such a community are 
politicians and government officials, together with other elites in think tanks, business and civil 
society.  
An epistemic community is not an exclusive guild with clear and impenetrable 
boundaries. They may be fluent and overlapping (Haas 1990). Epistemic communities may be 
transnational or limited to national boundaries. Here, the data seems to be primarily consistent 
with the existence of national epistemic communities regarding EMU reform. Clear national 
differences between academics, broadly corresponding to their governments’ revealed 
preferences, persist. Moreover, there is no one-on-one correspondence between the opinions of 
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academics with different academic majors on a country-by-country basis, which, in any case, will 
possess different amounts of political capital. 
We consider it to be extremely likely that the latter explanation is more salient than the 
former. Next to other uses of academic experts’ expertise, such as providing fodder for politicians 
seeking legitimation of their pre-given preferences, it is quite probable that academics, 
economists in particular, have influenced the economic policy preferences of their governing 
coalition to a significant degree. Blyth (2002) and Farrell & Quiggin (2012) emphasize the 
inherently political role of economic experts in economic crises. Both the construction and the 
downfall of the Keynesian consensus is unthinkable without the agency of economic experts, 
who take part in the struggle over how economic crises are defined and thus, what solutions are 
possible and appropriate. There is ample empirical confirmation of this relationship.  
Even if we assume that there are no significant direct, short-term channels of influence 
between academics and politicians, the opinions of economists will rub off on those advisors, 
representatives of interest groups, bureaucrats, decision-makers and party political operatives 
who have pursued university studies in economics. A wide array of studies on policy learning 
have ascertained that economics graduates’ opinion greatly differs according to the ideational 
orientation of the academics teaching at their alma mater. Professional training does not only 
teach technical knowledge. It directly influences graduates’ preferences by imparting a set of 
normative and causal beliefs (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998). Moreover, there is ample proof that 
graduate studies in economics not only affect graduates’ opinions, but also their acts when 
attaining positions of influence (Chwieroth 2007; Kogut & Macpherson 2011). For instance, 
when graduates of neoclassical economics departments of American universities reach influential 
positions at the IMF, they were more likely to effect more and more intensive capital account 
liberalization in countries when bargaining over structural adjustment programmes (Chwieroth, 
2007). The presence of University of Chicago-trained economics PhD’s relative to other US-
trained PhD’s, as well as American-trained PhD’s in general, was found to be associated with 
more and more intensive privatization efforts across a swath of developing countries (Kogut & 
MacPherson 2011). Furthermore, mainstream economic doctrine is also likely to have a 
discernible effect on public discourse on economic questions. As business and economics 
journalists mostly turn to national figures of authority in economics to comment on current affairs 
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and economic policy and refrain from challenging local economic orthodoxy, dominant opinion 
is likely to be reinforced by economic journalism (Dullien 2008).  
We consider this relationship to be highly probable in the present context of an EMU 
economic governance in severe crisis, which is defined by a high degree of complexity and 
causal uncertainty (Blyth 2007: 762). As actors struggle to define the problem and its apt 
solutions, the policy reactions of Member State governing coalitions are underdetermined by 
material interests. Crisis-defining ideas and concomitant policy proposals put forward by local 
actors are pivotal. This renders the role of academic experts increasingly central. The policy 
preferences of German academic experts have been stable, pre- and post-crisis, although policy 
has undergone dramatic change. The theoretical apparatus German economists employ has thus 
been sufficiently stable to affect similar policy preferences. The German outlier position observed 
in our survey, as well as in Frey (2007), is long-standing and has previously been empirically 
observed more than three decades ago. Among polled economists in 6 European countries, 
German economists were most likely to assume orthodox neoclassical policy positions, such as 
opposing minimum wages and support curtailing the power of labour unions (Frey 1983). Thus, 
causal uncertainty, mitigated by academic experts with long-standing preferences, increases the 
likelihood that our proposed causal arrow is critical.  
Likewise, the characteristics of the German knowledge regime contribute to the 
plausability of this hypothesis. For example, in Germany, prominent academic economists sit in 
advisory councils to the Ministries of Finance and Economics. Next to reports on specific issues, 
the Sachverständigenrat or German Economic Expert Council
19
 evaluates German and EU 
economic policy on a yearly basis. The amount of coverage this report receives and its political 
saliency is unmatched (Campbell & Pedersen 2014). This is reinforced by the governments’ 
obligation to publicly react to the the report.  
Only one member of the Council, Peter Bofinger, self-identifies as Keynesian and 
consistently writes minority opinions on issues related to fiscal and monetary policy. The  
political-economic preferences revealed in the majority opinions are consistent with our 
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 The Wirtschaftsweisen are proposed by the government and designated by the president. Traditionally, one 
candidate is put forward by the employer organization, one by the unions. 
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observations on the outlier position of German economists. After a brief flirtation with Keynesian 
ideas in the early ‘70’s, the Council made a significant contribution to the dominance  of 
monetarist thought in Germany. Consistently, it has pleaded for a monetary policy solely aimed 
at price stability. At the same time, it has argued against the dangers of ‘fine-tuning’, of short-
term anti-cyclical fiscal and monetary policy (Issing in SVR 2003: 64-65). Furthermore, it has 
pleaded succesfully for the implementation of a debt brake in the German constitution (SVR 
2007) and has persistently come out in opposition to the implementation of a minimum wage in 
Germany, let alone in Europe (For example: SVR 2014: nr. 192). In response to the Eurozone 
crisis, the majority unerringly pleads for enhanced fiscal consolidation (For example: SVR 2013: 
nr. 88) and structural reforms aimed at internal devaluation in periphery Member States. It rejects 
fiscal transfers and the issuance of common debt, primarily out of a concern for moral hazard.
20
 
Moreover, German current account surpluses were never so much as mentioned in relation to the 
Eurozone crisis. This has changed in 2014. In a report titled ‘More trust in market processes’, the 
Council concludes that deficits can indeed lead to instability, but that no satisfactory economic 
reasoning exists to constrain current account surpluses. It goes as far as stating that the concept of 
current account imbalances is politically defined and lacks a foundation in economic theory (SVR 
2014: nr. 405). 
The only study coming close with regards to political clout is the Gemeinschaftsdiagnose, 
commissioned by the Ministry of Economics. Teams of economists from different universities 
and research institutes compete for the right to create a bi-annual report on the state of the 
economy. Moreover, a slew of independent economic policy institutes (whose researchers are 
most often affiliated with universities) constantly comment on and analyse economic policy. No 
comparable channels of influence exist for political scientists. In short, for the likes of Germany, 
there are ample deductive reasons to expect the causal arrow to point from German academics, 
specifically economists, to politicians’ policy preferences. The same is true, mostly to a lesser 
degree, for other Eurozone member States, which do not possess such an elaborate and 
institutionalized system of economic policy advice (Campbell & Pedersen 2014).  
                                                          
20
 It did propose a temporary debt redemption fund in 2011, aimed at the existing debt stock, coupled with 
constitutional debt brakes and mechanisms that would automatically earmark revenues for debt repayment (SVR 
2011: 106). It has remained opposed to permanent fiscal transfers. 
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Finally, a causal narrative not inconsistent with both our findings and the latter argument, 
but emphasizing more structural factors determining the dominance of economic ideas, is 
presented by Hall (2014), who argues that the economic ideas predominant in the member states 
are functional to the economic models these Member States have developed. For example, the 
economic ideas that contributed to the development of export-led growth in Germany, become 
even more dominant in the wake of economic succes. Labour interests become more and more 
dependent on export-led growth to attain full employment and wage rises. Business interests will 
tend to become dominated by the export sector. Governing coalitions will increasingly count on 
export growth to secure satisfactory growth levels. Consequently, the economic ideas underlying 
this economic model gain more credibility and political currency through time. Similarly, Rodrik 
(2014) argues that emulation is arguably the strongest mechanism explaining policy diffusion. 
More then any abstract logic, actors are influenced by the perceived succes of an economic policy 
model, and adapt their policy preferences accordingly. Arguably, this is not solely relevant for 
international policy diffusion, but also for the currency of economic policy ideas within 
countries. 
Conclusion and implications for the future of EMU   
This paper has summarized and discussed the main conclusions of a survey among euro area 
academics on their position on several proposals on EMU reform. Firstly, although there is 
general approval in aggregate, German academics (and Finnish, but we should be cautious with 
only 5 respondents), more specifically economists, stand out with much lower support, and a 
clear majority among them opposes several proposals related to social and fiscal union. This is 
our most arresting finding, which fits the literature on the outlier role of German economists. 
Secondly, compared to core Member States, academics from the GIPS countries and Slovenia are 
more in favour of most of the reform proposals,
21
 especially those working towards banking and 
fiscal union.  
While this study cannot establish causality, it is clear that academics seem to hold onto 
positions to EMU reform that broadly coincide with their governments’ official position and are 
                                                          
21
 Due to the low number of Irish respondents, no conclusions can be drawn about the proclivities of Irish academic 
experts.  
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widely perceived to be in their countries’ (perceived) economic interests. We can conclude that 
no consensus on EMU reform amongst academics has been formed in the euro area after the 
crisis. Rather, a dissensus has persisted, which runs along national lines and the core-periphery 
divide. German economists seem to be extremely wary of significant reform to EMU. The data 
are consistent with causal narratives emphasizing the importance of economic ideas, inspired by 
ordoliberalism and neoclassical thought.   
Further research focusing on the role of academics and economists in particular should 
zoom in closer on the interrelation between the policy positioning and education of German 
economists. In the US and UK, significant divisions between top universities have been 
discovered when investigating citation networks (Önder & Terviö 2013). The position of German 
and other Eurozone economists in these citation networks could clarify the relative ‘salt’ present 
in German economics. More research into the ways through which academics influence German 
economic policy, and the political bent of this advice, is equally necessary.  
What does the German outlier position mean for Eurozone policy and economic policy in 
general? Five years into the crisis, the stability-oriented, anti-Keynesian consensus among 
German economists is at its zenith. Change in the German position towards economic governance 
in EMU is not likely to come about under the influence of German economists. However, it is 
clear that dominant academic, public and political preferences in Germany are not closed to 
change. Perceived policy failure has brought some actors in Germany to change their views to 
some degree. No longer ago than at the beginning of this decade, it would have been rather 
unimaginable to have the Sachverständigenrat plead for a debt redemption fund (cfr. SVR 2011) 
or the Bundesbank for stronger wage growth in Germany to ensure more symmetric rebalancing 
(Mussler 2014). It remains to be seen if and when economic depression and political upheaval in 
the periphery and, ever more, in the core, will counter the perceived ‘sweet smell of succes’ that 
stability-oriented policy in Germany has created.  
It will be one of Juncker’s greater challenges to convince German politicians, academics 
and the public in general that completing EMU is reconcilable with their views and preferences, 
and that their interests lie in the optimal functioning of the euro area.  
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Europe is in a constant state of flux. European politics, economics, law and indeed European 
societies are changing rapidly. The European Union itself is in a continuous situation of 
adaptation. New challenges and new requirements arise continually, both internally and 
externally.  
The College of Europe Studies series seeks to publish research on these issues done at the 
College of Europe, both at its Bruges and its Natolin (Warsaw) campus. Focused on the European 
Union and the European integration process, this research may be specialised in the areas of 
political science, law or economics, but much of it is of an interdisciplinary nature. The objective 
is to promote understanding of the issues concerned and to make a contribution to ongoing 
discussions. 
 
L’Europe subit des mutations permanentes. La vie politique, l’économie, le droit, mais également 
les sociétés européennes, changent rapidement. L’Union européenne s’inscrit dès lors dans un 
processus d’adaptation constant. Des défis et des nouvelles demandes surviennent sans cesse, 
provenant à la fois de l’intérieur et de l’extérieur. 
La collection des Cahiers du Collège d’Europe publie les résultats des recherches menées sur ces 
thèmes au Collège d’Europe, au sein de ses deux campus (Bruges et Varsovie). Focalisés sur 
l’Union européenne et le processus d’intégration, ces travaux peuvent être spécialisés dans les 
domaines des sciences politiques, du droit ou de l’économie, mais ils sont le plus souvent de 
nature interdisciplinaire. La collection vise à approfondir la compréhension de ces questions 
complexes et contribue ainsi au débat européen. 
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